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Brake Failure as Negligence Per Se
Otto J. Danker*
A LTHOUGH NUMEROUS AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS have been caused
by brake failure, the courts have yet to concur on a rule as
to the drivers' liability when the brakes fail without the driver's
knowledge that they were defective. In Ohio, the driver is held
to be negligent per se for the injuries resulting from an unfore-
seen brake failure. This rule was adopted in a recent case' when
the driver applied the brakes to stop the car for a traffic light.
As the brakes were applied, a brake system fluid leak suddenly
rendered the braking system of the auto inoperable, in spite of
the fact that the driver had taken reasonable care to assure its
proper performance. This brake failure resulted in an accident,
when the defendant's car collided with the rear of an automobile
which had stopped for the traffic light, causing injury to an oc-
cupant of the second car. The Ohio court held that the brake
failure was a self-created emergency which did not excuse the
defendant for failing to comply with the assured-clear-distance-
ahead statute, even though a jury had previously found the
standard of care accorded the braking system did not constitute
negligence, and that the driver operated the vehicle as a rea-
sonable person would under an emergency condition.
In another accident with substantially the same circum-
stances, an opposite opinion was held by a Mississippi court.2 A
truck driver, while slowing down his vehicle on a highway, found
his brakes were suddenly inoperable. His truck hit the rear of
the vehicle in front of him, with resulting injuries. Inspection
indicated the cause of the failure to be defective brake fit-
tings. The driver was not held negligent or liable for the in-
juries arising from this incident. Instead, the court held that an
operator is liable only if he is found to be guilty of negligence for
not discovering the defect. The court permitted the defendant
to present evidence of proper inspection of his vehicle and to
prove that the unforeseeability of the failure made it impossible
for him to comply with the adequate-brake statute.
When one is cognizant of the fact that each state has statutes
which require adequate braking systems and an assured-clear-
distance-ahead, one must question the disparity in the holdings
of these two recent decisions. The explanation lies in the in-
dividual attitude of each state towards the negligence per se
* B.S.M.E., Indiana Inst. of Technology; Project Engineer, T.R.W., Inc.;
Special Student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School of Baldwin-Wallace
College.
1 Bird v. Hart, 2 Ohio St. 2d 9, 205 N. E. 2d 887 (1965).
2 Southwest Mississippi Electric Power Ass'n. v. Harragill, 182 So. 2d 220
(Miss. 1966).
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rule, and each court's interpretation of the effect of the adequate
brake statutes on the ability of a person to comply with their
strict requirements.
At common law, the owner of a vehicle did not owe an
absolute duty to keep it in a safe and proper condition, but he
was responsible for its good operation and was generally liable
for injuries which resulted from his failure in this respect.3
Today, nearly all jurisdictions have statutes which supersede the
common law and impose a duty on the owner to maintain motor
vehicles in use on public highways with adequate brakes.4 Ohio
statutes, for example, state,
No person shall operate a vehicle without due regard for
the safety and rights of pedestrians and drivers and occu-
pants of all other vehicles, trackless trolleys, and street-
cars, so as to endanger the life, limb or property of any per-
son while in the lawful use of the streets or highways.6
And,
Every motor vehicle, when upon the highway shall be
equipped with brakes adequate to control the movement of
and to stop and hold such . . . motor vehicle, including two
separate means of applying the brakes, each of which means
shall be effective to apply the brakes to at least two
wheels .... 6
The courts have found the failure of a person to comply with
such statutes to be (1) negligence per se, (2) prima facie evi-
dence of negligence which would justify a finding of negligence
unless excused by other evidence in the case, or (3) some evi-
dence of negligence. 7
Most courts agree that a violation of a penal or criminal
statute constitutes negligence per se or negligence as a matter
of law.8 However, there is much diversity about non-penal stat-
utes. Negligence per se is usually loosely used and does not
necessarily mean the violator is liable for all injuries resulting
in all circumstances. Therefore, it is difficult to determine if the
cases are decided on negligence per se or on the evidence of neg-
ligence rule.9
3 3 Proof of Facts § Brakes p. 4 (1959).
4 Anno., 170 A. L. R. 615, at 615 (1947).
5 Ohio Rev. Code § 4511.20.
6 Ohio Rev. Code § 4513.20.
7 Supra n. 3.
8 Supra, n. 4, at 660; Rentscher v. Hall, 117 Ind. App. 255, 69 N. E. 2d 619
(1946). "Negligence per se" and "negligence as a matter of law" are sub-
stantially interchangeable, "negligence as a matter of law" sometimes being
used to aid the jury in understanding the effect of the statute.




The fact that some decisions hold that the failure of the in-
dividual to perform according to statutory requirements may be
excused by the evidence in the particular case does not neces-
sarily conflict with the rule that violation of a statute is negli-
gence per se. The prima facie negligence approach may be held
to be merely the assertion of the rule that the statutes are to
be interpreted in a reasonable manner, and that statutory duties
may be modified by the particular circumstances of each cause
of action.10 In Missouri, for instance, violation of the statute for
two adequate sets of brakes is negligence per se. But along with
this rule, the courts have developed a doctrine labeled factors of
excuse, justifiable violation, or excused violation which allows
the defendant to present evidence that he was without fault and
was unable to comply with the statutory requirements and is
thereby allowed to present his question of negligence to the
jury.1 1
Therefore, although the weight of authority holds that it is
negligence per se if the cause of injury is due to the violation of
a statute or ordinance containing specific requirements, and such
violation precludes the violator from recovery for damages, 12
many courts hold that the violation is merely evidence of negli-
gence which may be disproved by evidence to the contrary. This
rule was followed by a West Virginia court which held that vio-
lation of the statute dealing with adequate brakes constitutes
prima facie negligence, not negligence per se. The court held
that reasonable men may differ as to the driver's guilt and the in-
jured claimant's guilt of contributory negligence. The court left
it to a jury to determine whether the driver was charged with
notice that the brakes were defective after he knew the brakes
jerked the car when applied.13
Due to the various state courts' differences in interpreting
the adequate-brake statutes, a review of the effect of the vio-
lator's conduct on the evidence of negligence and the negligence
per se rule is required.
Evidence of Negligence
Many American courts follow the rule that the owner of a
vehicle is not liable if it can be shown that the failure to comply
with the statute was through no fault of his own.14 Even though
statutes require vehicles to be equipped with adequate brakes to
control the movement and stop the vehicle, violation does not
10 65 C. J. S. 426 (1950).
11 Allied Mutual Casualty Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 279 F. 2d 455
(10th Cir. 1960).
12 McCoy v. Courtney, 25 Wash. 2d 956, 172 P. 2d 596 (1946).
13 Spurlin v. Nardo, 145 W. Va. 408, 114 S. E. 2d 913 (1960).
14 Albers v. Ottenbacher, 79 S. D. 637, 116 N. W. 2d 529 (1962); Kohler v.
Sheffert, 250 Iowa 899, 96 N. W. 2d 911 (1959).
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charge the owner of the vehicle with negligence per se, but it is
only evidence of a statute violation which is to be considered
by the jury in determining if there is sufficient ground to find
the failure was not due to any fault of the defendant. 15 These
courts hold that statutes are designed for the protection of the
public, 16 and must be given reasonable interpretation to promote
their intended purpose.17 A New York case' s recently held that
the owner is not absolutely liable for noncompliance with the
statute, but must take reasonable steps to inspect and ascertain
the safety of the brake system. As such, he is chargeable with
notice of any defect that reasonable inspection would disclose. 19
If, however, the motorist can show an emergency not of his
making and over which he had no control, which made it im-
possible for him to comply with the statute regardless of the de-
gree of care he may have exercised, 20 or if nothing indicates that
the vehicle could have stopped in time to avoid the mishap even
with good brakes, and the driver was traveling within the proper
speed, the driver is not negligent merely because of defective
brakes.2 1
Authorities generally have adhered to the practice of allow-
ing expert opinion on the condition of the automobile or truck as
admissible when the facts are such that the opinion of an expert
can be of material assistance to aid the jury in considering the
evidence. 22 If the violator can offer proof that something oc-
curred without his fault, which due care and prudence could
not have prevented, and which made it impossible for him to
comply with the statute, the question must be put before a jury
to determine if his technical but unintentional violation of the
statute amounted to actionable negligence. The burden of proving
this legal excuse is on the defendant, 23 and if the violation is
admitted and no legal excuse is offered, negligence can be estab-
lished as a matter of law.2 4 Violation of a statutory regulation,
caused by a sudden and unforeseen failure is not, as a matter of
15 Green v. Werven, 275 F. 2d 134 (8th Cir. 1960); Dayton v. Palmer, 1 Ariz.
184, 400 P. 2d 855 (1965); Houston v. Adams, 389 S. W. 2d 872 (1965);
Yance v. Hoskins, 225 Iowa 1108, 281 N. W. 489 (1938).
16 Dayton v. Palmer, supra n. 15.
'7 Stephens v. Southern Oil Company of North Carolina, 259 N. C. 456, 131
S. E. 2d 39 (1963).
18 Alfano v. Amclir, 23 A. D. 2d 659, 257 N. Y. S. 2d 2 (1965).
19 Curtis v. Blacklaw, 403 P. 2d 358 (Wash., 1965); Southwest Mississippi
Electric Power Ass'n. v. Harragill, supra n. 2.
20 Brush v. Harvey Transfer Co., 146 Ohio St. 657, 67 N. E. 2d 851 (1946);
McConnell v. Herron, 402 P. 2d 726 (Ore., 1965).
21 Lively v. Atchley, 36 Tenn. App. 399, 256 S. W. 2d 58 (1952).
22 Vedder v. Bireley, 92 Cal. App. 52, 267 P. 724 (1928).
23 Lehman v. Haynam, 164 Ohio St. 595, 133 N. E. 2d 97 (1956).




law, an inexcusable violation resulting in civil liability.25 An ac-
cident occurred involving a vehicle which had both brakes and
rehoned drums, and the brakes had been operating in a proper
manner until inclement weather conditions rendered them inef-
fective. Again, a jury was asked to decide whether these facts
were sufficient to excuse the violation of the statute. 26 If no such
legal excuse exists, the owner is held to be negligent. 27
Courts have held that, by statute, the motorist is not an
insurer that his brake system is safe,28 adequate,29 and mechani-
cally perfect under all conditions.30 Nor is the owner of an auto-
mobile usually in the class of a supplier of a dangerous instru-
ment with a duty to inspect, but he is required to take reasonable
steps to inspect the car and ascertain its safety before operating
on a highway, 3 1 and act with care and diligence to see that his
brakes meet the standard of the statute. 32 The driver cannot
rely on the presumption that the brakes are safe, but if he per-
forms a test, such as applying foot pressure on the brake pedal,
and such a test does not indicate any defect, he may not be held
to be negligent.33 However, the mere fact that the owner drives
his car carefully does not insulate him from negligence liability
if he knew or should have known that the automobile had de-
fective brakes.34
When it is held that mere inadequacy of brakes is prima
facie evidence of a statute violation, the driver may not be
charged with violating the statute unless he had knowledge or
should have had knowledge, by the use of reasonable care, 35 and
the driver may defend by showing proper inspection and sudden
failure without warning.3 If the driver knew or should have
known of the defective brakes, the courts hold this knowledge
to be a material element of negligence or contributory negligence
which can prevent recovery for injury.37 When a person drives
with the knowledge that his brakes are so defective that they
will not operate properly, he is acting with heedless or reckless
disregard for others' rights, and he may be held to be grossly
25 Pollack v. Olson, 20 Wis. 2d 394, 122 N. W. 2d 426 (1963).
26 Amelsburg v. Lunning, 234 Iowa 852, 14 N. W. 2d 680 (1944).
27 Iowa Mutual Insurance Company v. Combes, 131 N. W. 2d 751 (1964).
28 Wheeler v. Rabine, 15 A. D. 2d 407, 224 N. Y. S. 2d 483 (1962).
29 Stephens v. Southern Oil Company of North Carolina, supra n. 17.
30 Alfano v. Amclir, supra n. 18.
31 Ibid.; Martino v. Barra, 67 Ill. App. 2d 328, 215 N. E. 2d 12 (1965).
32 Stephens v. Southern Oil Company of North Carolina, supra n. 17.
33 Id.
34 Chapman v. Blackmore, 39 Ohio App. 425, 177 N. E. 772 (1931).
35 People v. Pulizzi, 199 Misc. 405, 106 N. Y. S. 2d 680 (1950).
36 Sothoron v. West, 180 Md. 539, 26 A. 2d 16 (1942).
37 Marks v. Stolts, 165 A. D. 462, 150 N. Y. S. 952 (1914).
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negligent,38 reckless,39 willful or wanton,40 and is guilty of more
than slight want of ordinary care. 4' However, if the only ques-
tion of negligence is based on the suggestion that the brakes may
have been in a defective condition, it may not be held to be reck-
lessness.42 These courts have held that, although an unexcused
omission to comply with the statute is negligence in itself, notice,
either actual or constructive, 43 of the defect, is essential in order
to hold the owner in violation of the statute. 44 If the defect in
the brakes is readily discoverable, the failure is not "latent," 45
and the owner whose servant is driving with defective brakes
may be held to be negligent per se. 46 When a power brake
system is used which will not function when the motor is not
operating, the owner of the automobile is charged with knowl-
edge of a brake defect.47 If one borrows a car and then dis-
covers that the brakes are not in proper working order, it be-
comes a jury decision to determine whether the driver was neg-
ligent in his continued use of the car.48 If the driver's careless-
ness causes liability, he is guilty of negligence, 49 but he may be
excused from negligence as a matter of law if the accident re-
sulted from causes beyond his control and not by his miscon-
duct.50
The "reasonable and prudent person" consideration has also
been applied by the courts to the question of negligence.51 In
Dayton v. Palmer5 2 the owner had his power brakes checked eight
months prior to their failure. The brakes had operated properly
one quarter of a mile prior to their failure, which was due to a
diaphragm rupture. The court stated,
Before a person can be guilty of negligence, he must have
knowledge of his failure to do something that a reasonable
and prudent person would do or not do under the circum-
stances.
38 Bryll v. Bryll, 114 Conn. 668, 159 A. 884 (1932); Walters v. DuFour, 132
Cal. App. 72, 22 P. 2d 259 (1933).
39 Bryll v. Bryll, supra n. 38.
40 Rawlins v. Lory, 44 Cal. App. 2d 20, 111 P. 2d 973 (1941).
41 Puhr v. Chicago N. W. R. R., 171 Wis. 154, 176 N. W. 767 (1920).
42 Fleming v. Thorton, 217 Iowa 183, 251 N. W. 158 (1933).
43 Alfano v. Amclir, supra n. 18.
44 Lepke v. Sclafani & Son Inc., 20 Misc. 2d 50, 192 N. Y. S. 2d 58 (1959).
45 John W. Simmons Trucking Co. v. Briscoe, 373 P. 2d 49 (Okla., 1962).
46 William E. Harden v. Harden, 29 Ala. App. 411, 197 So. 94 (1940).
47 Woods v. Goodson, 349 P. 2d 731 (Okla., 1960).
48 Landry v. Hubert, 101 Vt. 111, 141 A. 593 (1928).
49 Southall v. Smith, 151 La. 967, 92 So. 402 (1922).
50 Albers v. Ottenbacher, supra n. 14.
51 Savage v. Blancett, 47 Ill. App. 2d 355, 198 N. E. 2d 120 (1964).




The court held that the statute does not ignore absolute liability
for a technical violation of the statute provision regardless of
fault. The court differentiated this case from the Womack v.
Preach 3 case in which it held that the violation of the statute
was negligence per se due to the fact that in that case the driver
knew of the defective brakes and the question of whether the
violation was within the intended meaning of the statute and
could be excused by showing the lack of fault was not a question
before the court.
Negligence Per Se
Recently several courts have employed the negligence per
se rule in an attempt to reduce the increasing number of auto-
mobile accidents. These courts hold that the motor vehicle
statutes impose a strict duty on the owner to maintain the brakes
in a proper condition, and if he fails to meet these standards, he
is not excused, but is guilty of negligence. 54 An Indiana court
held that the violation of the statute is negligence per se rather
than only a circumstance to be considered in addition to the
driver's conduct on the question of negligence. The court held
that the statute fixes a mechanical standard for brakes, and not
a standard of care, and that it remained for the jury to decide if
the brakes met the standard required by the statute.5 5 This
standard must not only be met at the time when the vehicle is
registered, but also must be maintained during any highway
operation.5 6 If the proximate cause of injury is due to the own-
er's noncompliance with the statute requirement of good and
sufficient brakes, he is held liable,5 - and a directed verdict may
be obtained.58 A summary judgment may also be given in a
rear-end collision if the defendant has no explanation except that
his brakes failed, since no proximate cause or negligence issue is
present. 59
Because the owner is bound to take notice that he may be
called upon to make emergency stops, he is held to be negligent
if he does not keep the brakes in proper condition for such pos-
sibilities.60 Violation of the provisions regarding brakes is held
to be a self-created emergency which does not provide an ex-
cuse for failing to comply with the assured-clear-distance-ahead
53 Womach v. Preach, 63 Ariz. 390, 163 P. 2d 280 (1945).
54 Ferran v. Jacquez, 68 N. M. 367, 362 P. 2d 519 (1961).
55 170 A. L. R. 660 (1947).
56 Turner v. Scanlon, 146 Conn. 149, 148 A. 2d 334 (1959).
57 Southall v. Smith, supra n. 49.
58 Bird v. Hart, supra n. 1.
59 Hamill v. Smith, 25 Conn. Sup. 183, 199 A. 2d 343 (1964).
60 Allen v. Schultz, 107 Wash. 393, 181 P. 916 (1919).
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statute." ' In Kehrer v. McKittrick,6 2 the operator failed to stop
at an intersection due to a brake failure caused by a small crack
in the diaphragm of a power brake cylinder. The emergency
brake system was tested and found to be inoperable. The court
held that the specific requirements of the statute relating to
brakes replaced the rule of ordinary care and, in order to pre-
clude liability for injury, the offender had to show that the acci-
dent was unavoidable and outside of her control, and not merely
that she was acting as a reasonable and prudent person under
the circumstances. The court further reasoned that the violator
had control over the brake system and its care and maintenance.
If one system fails due to lack of proper maintenance, the op-
erator cannot claim an unavoidable accident, even though the
other system failed through no fault of the operator. The fact
that a driver is within the assured-clear-distance-ahead statute
or the center-line statute does not excuse the violation, nor do
the facts that the operator had used ordinary care and that he
had had the brakes serviced less than six months prior to the
failure constitute a legal excuse. 3 Sudden failure of the brakes
is not an unavoidable failure, but is attributed to negligence,
which constitutes the proximate cause of the collision.6 4 Though
failure to comply with the statute is held to be negligence per se,65
if the brakes are in good condition but the emergency is caused
by the wrongful conduct of a third person,6 or failure to con-
trol the vehicle is due to a break in another unrelated structure,
the owner may not be held liable.6 7
Secondary Brake System
The fact that a statute sets up specific standards for the
capabilities of foot brakes s does not exclude there use also of
a standard for the capabilities of a secondary brake system.6 9
By statute, "adequate brakes in good working order" include
emergency and foot brakes.70 The emergency brake system is
considered a safety device which the motorist should employ if
61 Bird v. Hart, supra n. 1.
62 176 Ohio St. 192, 198 N. E. 2d 669 (1964).
63 Spalding v. Waxler, 2 Ohio St. 2d 1, 205 N. E. 2d 890 (1965).
64 Bird v. Hart, supra n. 1.
65 Hamill v. Smith, supra n. 59.
66 Satterthwaite v. Morgan, 141 Ohio St. 447, 48 N. E. 2d 653 (1943).
67 Allied Mutual Casualty Corp. v. General Motors Corp., supra n. 11;
Smith v. Finkel, 130 Conn. 354, 34 A. 2d 209 (1943).
68 Ohio Rev. Code § 4513.20.
69 Paulson v. B & L Motor Freight, 106 Ohio App. 530, 145 N. E. 2d 364
(1957).
70 McCoy v. Courtney, supra n. 12; Spalding v. Waxler, supra n. 63; Ohio




he is exercising ordinary care, if the foot brakes fail. 7 1 Failure
of the motorist to maintain an effective dual braking system is
actionable negligence when it is the proximate cause of injury.7 2
Due to this interpretation of the statute, it is mandatory that
both means of applying the brakes be kept in good working
order at all times, so that in the event the foot brake fails with-
out warning, the emergency brake can control the vehicle move-
ment.73
In Paulson v. B & L Motor Freight,7 4 the air brake line
broke without advance warning and left the tractor trailer sub-
stantially without any means of being brought to a stop. The sec-
ondary hand brake system was unable to stop the vehicle within
the adequate-brake requirements of the statute. The noncom-
pliance with the statute was viewed as the proximate cause of
the accident, for which the violator was held liable. However,
if both brake systems are inoperable due to the failure of an un-
related third item, the operator is not held to be negligent even
though the state holds the violation of the adequate brake
statute to be negligence per se. In Stump v. Phillians7 5 the
owner was not liable for the complainant's injury when a brake
failure occurred due to a weakness of a weld in the flange and
axle housing. The housing weld broke and pulled the hydraulic
fluid line and emergency cable, causing both to rupture, which
left the vehicle with an inoperable brake system. The court
excused both the violation of the adequate-brake and assured-
clear-distance-ahead statutes, in view of the fact that the un-
foreseeable housing failure had rendered both brake systems
useless.
Third Party Liability
In general, a manufacturer or seller is liable for resulting
injuries to persons or property when he sells a vehicle with de-
fective or inadequate brakes, 76 or brakes made of inferior ma-
terials.77 The driver of the vehicle is considered to be secondarily
liable and the manufacturer primarily liable, under the con-
cept that the manufacturer represents to the buyer that the
brakes are in good working order and the owner buys the ve-
71 Curtis v. Blacklaw, supra n. 19.
72 Davis v. New York Underwriters Ins. Co., 141 So. 2d 673 (La. App.
1962); Robertson v. American Home Assurance Company, 183 So. 2d 77
(La. App. 1966).
73 Spalding v. Waxler, supra n. 63.
74 Paulson v. B & L Motor Freight, supra n. 69.
75 2 Ohio St. 2d 209, 207 N. E. 2d 762 (1965).
76 Anno., 63 A. L. R. 398 (1931).
77 Ibid.; Quackenbush v. Ford Motor Co., 167 A. D. 433, 153 N. Y. S. 131
(1915).
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hicle reasonably believing this to be a condition of sale.78 In
Alfano v. Amclir,79 it was held that the owner of a vehicle with
defective brakes is not in pari delicto with the creator of the
brake defect, and that the owner may be passively negligent and
the creator actively negligent. If the owner drives a vehicle
with actual knowledge of the defect, he is guilty of negligent
operation and is barred from indemnity. If, however, he had
no actual knowledge of the defect, he is not actively negligent,
and he may hold the manufacturer liable. In another New
York case,8 0 the automobile dealer obtained no indemnity for
damages when he sold a new car with defective brakes. The
court held that the manufacturer and seller of products which
are inherently dangerous if defective, act negligently in carrying
out their duty to the owner. Also, a buyer of a second hand car,
rebuilt by the seller, may hold the seller in the same status as a
manufacturer, liable for damages to a third party injured by
the car, since the seller, with ordinary care, should have dis-
covered such defect.81
However, some states have followed the strict rule that the
automobile manufacturer who negligently equips the car with
defective brakes is not liable for injuries to third persons, since
no privity of contract exists.s 2 In a recent Illinois cases 3 it
was further held that although the statutes impose a duty on
the owner and seller to have adequate brakes to control the
movement of the vehicle, there is no indemnity by the manu-
facturer of component parts or by the seller, but that it was
the duty of the owner and operator to have adequate brakes, and
the owner could not defend on the basis that the brakes were de-
fective due to the fault of the manufacturer or seller.
Differences in court holdings also exist as to the indemnity
of a mechanic. In an action by automobile passengers against
the operator, the mechanic, and the owner who was not in the
car at the time of the accident, it was held that if the driver had
notice, he could be held liable to the passengers. The owner's
liability is statutory, based on passive negligence, and he could
hold the mechanic liable if the accident was caused by defective
brakes due to his acts.8 4 The opposite view was held in Beau-
champ v. B & L Motor Freight,85 in which case it was held that
78 Allied Mutual Casualty Corp. v. General Motors Corp., supra n. 11.
79 Alfano v. Amclir, supra n. 18.
80 Gilbert v. Barouch, 10 A. D. 2d 984, 202 N. Y. S. 2d 429 (1960).
81 Flies v. Vox Bros. Buick Co., 198 Wis. 496, 224 N. W. 705 (1929).
82 Fuller v. Palazzolo, 329 Pa. 93, 197 A. 225 (1938); Dillingham v. Chevro-
let Motor Co., 17 F. Supp. 615 (W. D. Okla. D. 1936).
83 Suvador v. White Motor Co., 51 Ill. App. 2d 318, 201 N. E. 2d 313 (1964).
84 Lipsam v. Warren, 10 A. D. 2d 868, 199 N. Y. S. 2d 761 (1960).




the owner's duty to exercise reasonable care in repairing brakes
could not be delegated to a mechanic.
Parked Cars
If brakes fail to hold a parked car, the question of negligence
is raised.80 The owner is guilty of negligence if the proximate
cause of injury to a car,8 7 a building or a person,s is due to de-
fective brakes. Evidence tending to prove that the owner failed
to set his brakes, or that the brakes were defective and would
not hold the parked car and thereby allowed the vehicle to roll
downhill and injure the complainant, provides sufficient cause to
hold the operator guilty of negligence. 89
Criminal Liability
Violation of statutes as to unintentionally killing another
while violating any law of the state that applies to the use of or
regulation of traffic,90 is generally only prima facie negligence,
not negligence per se.91 Criminal liability for a death ordinarily
requires actual knowledge of a brake defect. 9 2 If the owner
knows of the defect in his brakes, and that defect was the proxi-
mate cause of another's death,93 or if the proximate cause was
that he negligently did not maintain the secondary brake system
and the regular system failed, he may be held criminally liable.94
The evidence is not limited to a comparison of the owner's
brakes with the express statutory requirements of the Motor
Vehicle Code, but it can be viewed as wantonness amounting to
criminal negligence if the brake failure is the proximate cause.95
And if the owner had reason to know that the brakes were poor,
and if this violation of the statute is the proximate cause of
death, it is negligence per se, and the offender cannot use con-
tributory negligence as a defense.90
86 McCoy v. Courtney, supra n. 12.
87 American Prod. Co. v. Villwock, 7 Wash. 2d 246, 109 P. 2d 570 (1941).
88 Anno., 170 A. L. R. 623 (1947).
89 Bundy v. Belue, 253 N. C. 31, 116 S. E. 2d 200 (1960).
J0 Ohio Rev. Code § 4511.18; 170 A. L. R. 615.
91 Roeder v. Fisher Bakery Inc., 118 Ohio App. 339, 188 N. E. 2d 78 (1963).
92 Commonwealth v. Tackett, 299 Ky. 731, 187 S. W. 2d 297 (1945).
93 People v. Rauch, 252 A. D. 795, 299 N. Y. S. 155 (1937).
94 State v. Kotapish, 171 Ohio St. 349, 171 N. E. 2d 505 (1960).
95 West v. State, 139 Tex. Crim. 177, 139 S. W. 2d 90 (1940).
96 State v. Medlin, 355 Mo. 564, 197 S. W. 2d 626 (1946); Womack v. Preach,
supra n. 53.
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Conclusion
Although statutes have set standards for brakes, and failure
to comply is negligence per se, the majority of courts generally
hold that the statutes must be reasonably interpreted, and that a
person may offer evidence to show that his failure to comply
was not due to his lack of care. If, however, the owner had
knowledge, or had reason to have knowledge, that the brake
system was defective, he is liable. If the foot brake system in-
advertently fails and the secondary system also is negligently in-
operative, the owner is liable since the statute applies to both
brake systems, unless it is the fault of the manufacturer, in
which case he may be indemnified.
Several states, including Ohio, have recently held that the
owner is liable for all brake failure damages resulting from the
violation of the statute, and that such a brake failure does not
result in an unavoidable accident, but is the proximate cause of
the collision. While this may seem to be a harsh interpretation
of the statute, such harshness is necessary in order to protect
innocent victims of the numerous accidents caused by brake
failure. Protection of the innocent is the responsibility of law;
a safe, operable vehicle is the responsibility of the possessor.
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol16/iss1/14
